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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Paglieri’s main claims in this paper are three: 1) that argumentation theorists have 
given insufficient attention to decision-theoretic considerations in their work, 2) 
that a decision-theoretic approach to argumentation promises to yield important 
results and 3) worries that decision-theoretic approaches to argumentation are not 
capable of generating normative recommendations are misplaced. All of these 
claims together, of course, are meant to suggest that argumentation theorists should 
embrace decision-theoretic approaches to their subject. In these brief comments I 
will offer a few words about each of Paglieri’s main claims. The general point of my 
comments will be that while I disagree with Paglieri’s defense of a decision-
theoretic approach to argumentation in this paper, I agree with him that decision 
theory has much to offer to the study of argumentation. 
 
2. DECISION THEORY AND INFORMAL LOGIC 
 
In one sense the claim that informal logicians have not incorporated decision theory 
in a central way is obviously true. One finds scant discussion of the prisoner's 
dilemma, Arrow's theorem, and the like in the informal logic and argumentation 
corpus. And certainly they could have been there. The game-theory- and decision-
theory-influenced works of John Rawls, Kurt Baier, David Gautier, and Gregory 
Kavka were all well known before or during the period of significant initial activity 
in philosophy around informal logic.  
Nevertheless, inasmuch as this observation is meant as criticism, it must be weighed 
against the fact that the pioneers of informal logic were interested in moving away 
from formal, abstract approaches to describing and evaluating human reasoning. It 
would rather have taken the sting out of the ’'informal’ in “informal logic“ to eschew 
the deductive canons of reasoning so dominant in philosophy in favor of a no-less-
formal set of mathematical canons from the social sciences.  
 The point of informal logic, it seems to me, has been to work at 
understanding precisely those dimensions of argumentation in specific and 
interpersonal reasoning in general that are not captured by formal approaches--
those features from which formal approaches must abstract in order to do their 
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work. Early on this point was polemic as well as methodological, as one goal of 
informal logic in the early days was to unseat the notion that formal methods were 
the best or the only “real“ way to study reasoning at all. Hence, if informal logicians 
have paid scant attention to decision theory, this is perhaps more charitably 
understood as predictable consequence of deeper theoretical, methodological, and 
political commitments than as a kind of oversight or blind spot in their thinking.  
I suspect that the dialecticians and pragma-dialecticians may also take some 
exception to Paglieri’s characterization of their approaches here, but as I am less 
familiar with these approaches I will not do them the disservice of an incapable 
defense. 
 
3. THE POTENTIAL OF THE DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH 
 
As a central exhibit of the potential of a decision-theoretic approach to 
argumentation, Paglieri presents a handy, process-based, six-category taxonomy of 
types of decisions that arguers make, ranging from decisions about whether to 
argue at all to decisions about how and when to offer particular arguments, to 
decisions about how to react to arguments one is offered by one's interlocutors. This 
is, indeed, a handy device, but what one finds most striking about it is not its novelty 
but its familiarity. Despite his having taken great pains to separate his approach 
from informal logic and pragma-dialectics in the early portions of the paper, the six-
category taxonomy, at nearly every level, seems to recall considerations that are 
familiar from either those two approaches or from more rhetorically oriented 
approaches.  
 This in itself is not a bad thing, though. Intentional or not, I think the 
familiarity serves Paglieri’s purpose here. The six categories can easily be taken as a 
sort of “proof of concept” demonstration that concerns familiar to argumentation 
theorists can be described with the tools of decision theory. Game-theory may give 
us another way of talking about familiar topics such as how persons choose whether 
or not to argue when confronted with a difference of opinion, or about how a rhetor 
might frame and time her arguments in such a way as to maximize their effect upon 
her audience. It may yield an additional stream of empirical evidence that helps us 
better understand some dimensions of these phenomena--and that's not nothing. 
It's quite significant, if in fact decision theory can give us such data. To the extent 
that this is what Paglieri means when he claims that game-theory has much to offer 
argumentation theory I am inclined to agree with him. If, however, Paglieri intends 
the stronger thesis that game-theory can offer more than perspicuous modeling of 
familiar dimensions of interpersonal argumentation then I think his case requires a 
different sort of example. Best would be if he could produce an example of a novel 
insight from decision theory that the other frameworks have not already arrived at, 
or better, could not have arrived at, using their own resources. 
 
4. RATIONALITY, NORMATIVITY, AND ARGUMENTATION  
 
The most interesting part of Paglieri’s arguments in this paper concern his claims 
that a game theoretic approach to argumentation is capable of standing shoulder-to-
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shoulder with other approaches when it comes to the normative domain. The idea is 
not a new one. Well-developed, decision-theoretic approaches have been around in 
moral and political philosophy for some time. Gauthier (1986) is a prime example, 
as are the theories referenced in chapters 3 and 4 of Shapiro (2003). Still others, for 
example Tuck (1979), would say they have been around since the days of Thomas 
Hobbes. All of these represent attempts to ground normativity (either of ethical or 
political obligations) in theories of practical reason. Paglieri’s proposal is very much 
in this spirit. As he says: “In sum, far from relinquishing normative concerns in the 
study of argumentation, a decision-theoretic perspective on argumentative 
processes offers for free many powerful tools for defining and assessing the 
rationality (or lack thereof) of arguers” (p. 5). 
 Clarity about the kind of rationality at issue is important here. As Paglieri 
makes clear in the paragraph immediately following the one just quoted it is 
strategic rationality, understood as “what is rational to do, given a certain set of 
preferences, beliefs, and current external conditions.“ Paglieri, to his credit, 
immediately recognizes this: “Admittedly, this is very different from the kind of 
rationality usually discussed in argumentation theories“. Indeed, it certainly is.  
 In decision-theoretic terms the rationality of a particular choice is cashed out 
in terms of its leading to the most optimal outcome (among those possible in the 
context) for a self-interested agent who is driven, (typically) by nothing more than a 
desire to maximize the satisfaction of its preferences. To speak in a somewhat 
plainer if not entirely clearer way, the sort of rationality involved in decision-
theoretic concerns is prudential or practical in nature. Those norms direct agents 
towards the most optimal choice-path for the achievement of their goals, given the 
context of the choice situation. As seekers of optimal outcomes under such 
conditions the agents of decision theory are, in essence, members of a type of 
utilitarian consequentialists. On this view a person acts rationally if she makes 
decisions that conduce to the maximization of her preferences. Applied to 
argumentation theory, this means that a person will act rationally if she argues (i.e. 
offers arguments, makes challenges, retractions or other kinds of argumentative 
moves) in a way that conduces to the maximization of her preferences. (In all of 
Paglieri’s examples, securing adherence for her thesis is among these preferences.) 
 By contrast, the sort of rationality typically involved in argumentation theory 
ranges from the Popper-ian critical rationality of the heart of pragma-dialectics (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 16-17) to the notion of “the ability to engage in 
the practice of giving and receiving of reasons” in Johnson (2000, p. 14), to the not 
unrelated notion of rationality as the having of “reason-assessment abilities and 
reason-honoring dispositions” in Siegel (1999, p. 47), to name just a few. On views 
like these, a person is rational not if she exhibits skill at maximizing preference 
satisfaction but if her conduct comports with external norms of reasonable 
behavior. Satisfaction of the norms might result in the satisfaction of her individual 
preferences, but it might not. Applied to argumentation theory, these views have the 
consequence that a person will act rationally only if she makes argumentative 
moves that exhibit the appropriate sort of respect for the norms of reasonability 
(and other values) that apply specially to argumentation.  
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 There is a wide gap between ‘rationality’ of the strategic, decision-theoretic 
sort and ‘rationality’ of the latter sort. The gap is so wide between decision-theoretic 
rationality and rationality construed otherwise that it once led Robert Nozick to 
remark that decision-theory was “not a theory of rational action at all, but of best 
action”, ‘best action’ being understood as that most conducive to the agent's goals, 
full stop (Nozick, 1993, p. 65). We need not go so far as Nozick to see problem before 
us: Paglieri defends the normativity of the decision theoretic approach by saying 
that it is sometimes rational to allow strategic considerations to outweigh moral and 
epistemic considerations in argumentative decision making. But for this claim to be 
plausible, one has to believe already that decision-theoretic rationality is the sort 
that governs argumentation in the sense of grounding all or most of its most 
important norms. Hence the defense of the normativity of decision-theoretic 
considerations here is somewhat question-begging. If argumentation doesn't work 
like this, as would be the case if, pace Johnson the purpose of argumentation were to 
manifest rationality, for instance, then it would seem less likely that one could 
defend as optimal strategies that involved lying to one's interlocutors by their 
wonderful outcomes.  
 None of this should be taken to suggest that strategic considerations are 
unimportant. Strategic considerations may well be rational in a sense and so 
normative in a sense, but the truth of this observation does not establish the sort of 
moral equivalence between strategic considerations and considerations of 
reasonableness and argumentative fair dealing that derive from the usual sense of 
rationality in play in argumentation theory. Thus, this part of Paglieri’s argument is 
somewhat less than convincing. I do not, however, see this as necessarily damning 
to his larger project.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Decision theory may not be capable of explaining, in normative terms of the familiar 
sort, why we should not use a fallacious form of argument, or engage in deception in 
cases where doing such things clearly is the most optimal path to getting adherence 
for our thesis, but so what? To dismiss decision theory as “merely descriptive“ is to 
miss the importance and value of having good descriptions. To dismiss it on grounds 
of insufficient normativity is to expect too much. Paglieri is quite right to point out 
that decision theory is excellent at identifying prudential or strategic incentives for 
making moves in argumentation, and as no one denies that skillful arguing does 
require a balancing of practical requirements—along with ethical, rhetorical, logical, 
epistemic, communicative and other requirements—it seems to me that this ought 
to be enough. If we are capable of recognizing the importance of selecting an 
appropriately effective argumentation strategy from other standpoints within 
argumentation theory, such as dialectics or rhetoric, then we should be capable of 
recognizing the relevance of decision theory to such investigations. If we get this far, 
then it seems to me that Paglieri’s battle is very nearly won. We do not have to think 
that decision theory is normative in a way that extends beyond the domain of the 
prudential in order to see that its insights are worth taking seriously. 
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